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Determinants of Success In Reform Strategies: A Case Study of Hungary and
Poland
Abstract
The capacity of a post-communist country to minimize social pain is essential to the very existence of the
new government. In studying the transitional economies of Eastern Europe, it is important to attempt to
determine what factors have lead to a level of success in not only moving towards a market economy, but
also in minimizing the social pain of that transition. Hungary and Poland have been cited as two of the
most successful nations in moving towards economic success (Slay, 1994). Interestingly, these two
countries selected different reform strategies, the gradualist approach and the shock therapy approach
respectively. With these different strategies, they have met with similar results, results that are some of
the most optimistic in all of Eastern Europe. This study will analyze how two very different reform
strategies can produce similar outcomes. The paper will attempt to determine the other factors that have
been important to the success of these two case studies.

This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/
respublica/vol1/iss1/8

Res Publica

45

Laurel E. Martin
Determinants of Success In Reform Strategies:
A Case Study of Hungary and Poland

The capacity of a post-communist country to minimize social pain is
essential to the very existence of the new government. In studying the
transitional economies of Eastern Europe, it is important to attempt to
detennine what factors have lead to a level of success in not only moving
towards a market economy, but also in minimizing the social pain of that
transition. Hungary and Poland have been cited as two of the most successful
nations in moving towards economic success (Slay, 1994). Interestingly,
these two countries selected different reform strategies, the gradualist
approach and the shock therapy approach respectively. With these different
strategies, they have met with similar results, results that are some of the
most optimistic in all of Eastern Europe. This study will analyze how two
very different refonn strategies can produce similar outcomes. The paper
will attempt to detennine the other factors that have been, important to the
success of these two case studies.
Successful refonn is difficult to measure. However, in this study, success
will be measured on two levels. One aspect of success is in basic economic
indicators. Thus, in this sense, success in Poland and Hungary will be
measured by per capita gross national product (GNP), inflation rates, growth
of the private sector, and unemployment rates. These are important economic
indicators because they can directly influence the degree of social pain
produced by economic transition. However, measuring social pain should
not be limited to quantitative indicators, The general population's perception
of social pain is also important. It is possible to have success on a number
of key economic indicators and still have a high degree of social pain.

Background
For the past several decades, the economies of Eastern Europe have been
centrally planned by the communist party. This central planning succeeded
in creating a specific set of values, institutions, and attitudes that created a
framework in which society functioned. Now, after the fall of communism,
the newly democratic governments in Eastern Europe are attempting to change
this framework in order to establish a market system. The old system must
be cast aside in order to successfully establish the framework for a market
economy. But economic change is often accompanied by social pain, and in
the Eastern European nations, worker displacement, a changing employment
structure, and the problems left by communism, have generated a high degree
of social pain. One good indicator of social pain is the average income of
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workers. Table 1 indicates that compared to Western Europe or Asian newly
industrializing economies (NlEs), Eastern Europe lags far behind.

Table 1
Average Monthly Dollar Wage, 1990-93

Bulgaria
Czech"
Hungary
Poland
Romania
West Europeb
Asian c

1990
136
198
214
139
176
2,037
532

1991
63
139
233
209
143
2,120
608

1992
96
169
278
222
87
2,293
685

1993
125
205
298
235
102
2,127
734

Source: u.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
'Data for Czech Republic
b Average of France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy
'Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan

This has in part lead to a debate concerning what is the best way to
make the transition. Governments are faced with two basic policy options,
the gradualist or shock therapy approaches. It is important to look at the
predicted results of both strategies because the very survival of the new
democracies may very well depend on their economic success. The well
being of the economy can give legitimacy, satisfaction, and voter trust to the
new government. However, if the new government is unable to provide a
basic level of economic well-being, much less a successful economy, it faces
the chance of being replaced. Indeed, in several East European nations, the
socialist party has seen a return to power.

Literature Review
Most economists agree on certain components of overall transitional
strategy. They generally agree that in order to establish a private market
economy, four goals need to be met (MareI', 1993; Bosworth and Ofer, 1995;
Slay, 1993). First, there must be macroeconomic stabilization. This
encompasses tight budget and credit policy to head off rising inflation, trade
deficits, and growing governmental debt Second, there must be liberalization.
Policies of liberalization can eliminate trade barriers so that cross-border
movement of capital, services, technology, and ideas can be maintained.
Third, prices must be freed and currency must be devalued. Finally, the
exchange rate needs to be flexible and currency has to be convertible.
Economists agree that privatization of the economy is also an essential
element to the development of a market economy. This entails the
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development of a private sector, property rights, land and housing reform,
dismantling state enterprises, and commercializing businesses. Finally, most
economists advocate polices that develop a market-supporting institutional
infrastructure. This includes banking reforms, monetary reforms, legislative
action--perhaps constitutional change--and regulatory and insurance reform.
The issues that economists disagree upon are the speed, the sequence,
and the intensity of how these four points should be implemented into the
economy. Thus arises the debate between the shock therapy or the gradualist
approach to transition. Jeffrey Sachs is perhaps one of the most well-known
economists who advocates the shock therapy approach to transition. This
approach has been termed a "leap to a market system" (Sachs, 1994). He
advocates moving as quickly as possible to a market system. Policy requires
simultaneous and fast implementation of transition strategy on all four points.
Accordingly, as the population experiences a high degree of social pain, this
will be replaced by benefits in the long run.
After the 1989 fall of communism, Poland swiftly embarked upon a
transition to a market economy. Leszek Balcerowicz was selected by the
Mazowiecki government as the deputy prime minister and fiance minister.
Balcerowicz, with support from the West, the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF), embarked upon shock therapy. It was decided that
the best way to deal with hyperinflation and other economic problems was
by making a clean and quick break with the past. This move included
balancing the governmental budget, slowing monetary growth, and increasing
interest rates (Slay, 1993).
The critics of shock therapy often argue that its intense social pain is too
great a price to ask the people to pay. In addition, such social pain can also
lead to disillusionment in the government that is implementing the policy.
In the new democracies, public support for governmental policy is essential
for their subsequent success. Robert Freedman states, "Workers acceptance
of transitional costs will have a profound effect on the success of transition
programs" (Sachs, 1994: 18).
The gradualist approach is defined by The Economist (21 September
1991) as the strategy that puts the greatest priority on creating infrastructure
to support a market economy before making other changes. The gradualist
approach also advocates government regulation in the switch from
predominately state-owned enterprises to private enterprises. This strategy
builds upon the idea that the development of market institutions is a gradual
process; attempting to function as a pure market economy without those
institutions will only lead to a greater crisis (Slay, 1994).
Hungary has been experiencing a gradual shift in economic structure
since 1968 with the implementation of the New Economic Mechanism
(NEM). Besides this, Hungary was able to implement several capitalist
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features despite communist control in return for their cooperation. For
example, legislative action in 1984 and 1987 gave way for state enterprises
to have a degree of privatization (White, 1993).
Research Design
It has been six years since the fall of communism. Hungary and Poland
have seen similar results despite different strategic approaches. These results
have been deemed some of the most successful in all of Eastern Europe in
that they have progressed the furthest towards the establishment of a market
economy. Of course, after only six years, success is tentative. And by any
standard, the success of these countries is only relative. Both countries are
still faced with severe economic problems and still have a long road to travel
before they are healthy, functioning market economies.
Table 2 demonstrates the similar success levels in Hungary and Poland
after six years. These are basic economic indicators that partially demonstrate
how the two countries have moved towards a market economy while keeping
social pain in check. A high labor force participation rate as well as a growing
Table 2
EDIMP's Window into Economic Policy, World Bank
1990
Unemployment
1.5%
Hungary
Poland
6.1%

1991

1992

1993

7.8%
11.5%

14%
15.5%

13.7%
15%

Labor Force Participation
83%
Hungary
76%
Poland

**
**

74%
74%

71%
71%

35.8%

**
**

Share of Private Sector Employment
32%
34%
Hungary
33.6%
40.3%
Poland

44.4%

GNP in U.S. Dollars (From 1995 World Tables)
1988
1989
1990
1991
2750
2830
2920
3030
Hungary
2010
1990
1730
1840
Poland

1992
3210
1970

1993
3350
2260

private sector means more people will have opportunities to work in the
private sector. Downward trends in unemployment indicate that more people
are beginning to find work. A higher GNP at the end of the six year period
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means that in general the population has seen a higher standard of living.
All of these factors indicate relative lessening of social pain.
As can be seen, unemployment rose in both countries during the indicated
four year period. However, these relatively close unemployment rates in
1993 have begun a downward trend, compared to several Eastem European
countries which are still seeing an increase in unemployment levels. For
example, the Slovak Republic experienced a 3% increase in unemployment
from 1992 to 1993. Bulgaria and Romania witnessed a 1% growth in
unemployment in that time period.
Private sector growth is one of the most important and effective ways in
making a successful transition to a market economy. Poland and Hungary
by far have the highest share of private sector employment. In 1992 Russia
had 25.9%, Bulgaria had 14.1 %, and Romania had only 12%. At the end of
the six year period, both Poland and Hungary have a higher GNP than in
1988, despite Poland's dip in between. This dip was the expected result of
shock therapy. Many other transitional countries are experiencing either
negative or zero growth in GNP levels. Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic, and
Romania all had this experience in 1994 (Bosworth and Ofer, 1995).
These results demonstrate that there must have been similar occurrences
that either happened before the fall of communism, or during both reform
programs, that contributed to the relative successs and similar economic
conditions. It constitutes an interesting puzzle to consider how Poland, which
embarked upon a course of shock therapy, a strategy that is expected to
create intense social pain, arrived at the same place as Hungary. The results
of Hungary and Poland's transition seem to indicate that the debate between
the different reform strategies is unwarranted. Reform success may not only
depend on the speed or sequence of reform policies. Rather, other outside
factors may be just as important.
The remainder of this paper will explore four variables common to both
Poland and Hungary that help explain the similar outcome of their different
reform strategies. The variables are previous reforms, the nature of the
emerging governments, emphasis on the private sector, and foreign
involvement and investment.

Previous Reforms
Previous refoffi1s are an important aspect in deteffi1ining the success of
later reform. Previous refoffi1s can set the stage for capitalist behaviors and
institutions that are necessary for a market economy to function. If a nation
has had a degree of experience with capitalism, it will have a better chance
of adapting to the changes implemented during transition.
Hungary under Janos Kadar was able to form a "social compact" with
the Hungarian people and Moscow that allowed it to experiment with different

50

economic and domestic reforms (White, 1993). The Soviet Union was willing
to look the other way and give Hungary concessions and flexibility that few
other East European nations were able to experience.
The most important early reform was the implementation of the NEM
in 1968. The NEM was successful to a degree in loosening state controls on
the economy. It allowed for the self-management of collective farming which
allowed individuals to begin to experience a market system. One of the
most interesting aspects of the NEM was that it allowed factory workers to
use state-owned enterprises for private production after regular working hours.
This gave way to an emphasis on qUality rather than quantity, and to incentives
for producing more efficiently. Here began the early development of tile
culture of private, profit driven endeavors.
The NEM was not able to change the ideological favoritism the heavyindustrial sector saw over other sectors such as services or consumer goods.
This kept many of the "unnatural" tendencies of central planning alive in
Hungary. Secondly, some of the capitalist features of the NEM disrupted the
status quo. Some workers who were not receiving direct benefits of the
reform measures began to feel threatened by signs of growing capitalism.
Their resentment towards the progranl added to political tension concerning
the reforms (Rothschild, 1993).
But, overall, the NEM was able to give Hungary a head start over most
of the other Eastern European nations. In 1989 when countries were just
beginning to implement market reforms, Hungary all ready had twenty years
experience. After the NEM, there was a move to allow small partially private
businesses in 1980. The eighties also saw joint stock companies, share issuing,
and even a stock exchange. These reforms were also accompanied by banking
reforms which included the establishment of commercial banks free to
compete with one another. Bankruptcy regulations forced businesses to
become more efficient. The net effect of such policies allowed most of the
necessary institutions of a market economy to be established by 1989 (White,
1993).
In Poland, the situation was different politically, but ironically it led to
similar results economically. Unlike Hungary, the Poles were never willing
to give their acquiescence to Moscow. The difficulties that the Soviet Union
experienced in permeating all aspects of Polish society resulted in the
agricultural sector never being completely taken over by central planning.
Before 1989,80% of the agricultural sector was privately owned (Shen, 1993).
This left a substantial and important economic sector still "marketized."
Besides the largely private agricultural sector, the powerful Solidarity
movement enabled Poland to secure some reforms before 1989. Target
planning by the central authority was replaced by decision making made by
local managers. New initiative systems were implemented that were based

Res Publica

51

on profitability rather than meeting specific quantity requirements. Many of
the ministries responsible for central planning were eliminated or reduced.
New associations were formed to be accountable to the very enterprises they
represented, rather than the central authority. This was hoped to make
implementation of policy and distribution of inputs more efficient.
A second stage of reform occurred in 1986 and 1987. The second stage
attempted to complete the reforms of the first stage while establishing the
foundation for a socialist market economy (Slay, 1993). The development
of an Anti-monopoly Bureau, an Export Development Bank, and legislation
permitting Polish firms to embark upon large-scale business partnerships
with Western firms helped to decrease the number of state monopolies, and
increase foreign trade and investment.
Other aspects of the second stage aimed at establishing a structure for a
partial market economy to function. Prices were freed, enterprises were
expected to be self-financing, and some unprofitable enterprises were
eliminated. While these refonns by no means len the Polish economy in a
position to switch easily to a market economy, they were able to begin to
form a different set of institutions and attitudes than those that predominated
under pure central planning.
Emerging Government After the Fall of Communism
The government that emerges after the fall of a long established power
is important in that it will guide the course of the country. If the new
government is unpopular, political problems may take center stage in the
new country. It is difficult for a nation in severe political turmoil to be able
to carry out effectively any type of reform, whether it be gradualist reform or
shock therapy. Both Hungary and Poland emerged from the fall of
communism with a government capable and willing to initiate .economic
changes. This, in addition to the fact that the emerging government were
relatively popular, may have facilitated the acceptability of the different
reform strategies.
In Hungary, Joseph Antall was president of the Hungarian Democratic
Forum (HDF) party. The HDF was the largest party in parliament. In a
coalition formed with the Independent Smallholders Party (ISP) and Christian
Democratic People's Party (CDPP) parties, both of which were ideologically
similar to the HDF, Antall was able to form a stable government Antall's
coalition was the first such coalition formed without a communist party since
before World War 1. This was important because with the elimination of the
communist influence, the Hungarian government was given a new sense of
legitimacy. In addition, Antall was able to secure an agreement with the
Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) party to ensure that his reform legislation
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would not be blocked. This gave him some power to decide and execute
policies.
Lech Walesa, the former leader of Solidarity, became Poland's first
popularly elected president after winning 75% of the vote in the elections.
After the fall of communism, some Poles were disturbed at the disorganization
and inability of the legislature to formulate and implement policy. Thus,
they saw a remedy in the creation of a strong executive power. Walesa seemed
the perfect candidate to fill this role after spending a decade fighting for the
rights of the working people under communism.
The Balcerowicz Plan that was begun under the Mazowiecki government,
called for a rejection of the past and swift movement towards a market system.
With Walesa in power, there was an added legitimacy for the strategy. Shock
therapy necessarily calls for social pain, but believing the future could bring
better things and encouraged by a popular leader, the Polish people were
willing to undertake shock therapy. Walesa himself was a well-known
supporter of rapid economic change. Perhaps the course of Poland's reform
would have been significantly different had Walesa not been the first President.

Emphasis on the Private Sector
Theoretically, privatization is one of the strongest and most effective
means of transforming an economy from central planning to the market.
The most basic idea of capitalism is that the means of production should be
privately owned. Privatization can bring in public revenues, develop an
entrepreneur class, create jobs, and change the attitudes and ideas that have
been sustained by central planning. But privatization is a difficult process
laced with many hard choices. The development of huge state enterprises is
one of the legacies of communism. The average number of employees in
these state enterprises was close to 1,200 compared to the Western average
near 375 (Sachs, 1994). In converting these giant companies to private
companies, often down-sizing or perhaps even phasing out the corporation is
necessary.
During communism, there was also an unnatural emphasis on heavy
industry, leaving many other sectors of the economy underdeveloped. This
creates two problems for privatization. First, while there is needed
development in the service or consumer good sector, there is little knowhow. Secondly, if the vast number of employees and means of production
have been focused on heavy industry, it will be difficult to refocus those on
a different aspect of the economy. Workers will need to be retrained, perhaps
even relocated. Perhaps most important, workers will no longer have the
social safety net that communism provided for them in the past. A centrally
planned economy could maintain a surplus of labor simply because its ultimate
goal was employing the population. A market economy requires firms to
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hire according to profitability. All of these problems with privatization give
potential for social pain.
Hungary and Poland have both acknowledged the difficult problems that
they are facing on the road to complete privatization. Yet, they have both
made a commitment to the private sector. Table 3 shows that both countries
are leading in the growth of the private sector.
Table 3
Share of Private Sector Employment
Bulgaria
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Rep.

1990

1991

*

10.1%
19.9%
34%
40.3%
6.9%
18.3%
12.8%

8.1%
32%
33.6%

*

11%
4.9%

1992
14.1%

*

35.8%
44.4%
12%
25.9%
17%

Source: EDIMP's Window into Economic Policy, World Bank

It is interesting to compare this share of private sector employment with
overall unemployment rates. Poland, which has the highest share of private
sector employment, also has one of the highest overall unemployment rates.
Hungary has also seen this positive relationship. The reason for this could
be because of what economists have termed "labor shedding" in the conversion
of state-owned enterprises to private enterprises (Blanchard, 1995). Labor
shedding is another aspect of social pain seen in transitional economies.
Legislation dating back to 1982 has demonstrated that the Hungarian
government demonstrates the development of a private sector as an essential
part of economic success. Since then, the most important legislation occurred
in 1988 and 1989 with the Company Law and the Law of Transformation
(Sachs, 1994). These two laws allowed for new forms of businesses to be
established, including limited liability companies and stock companies. The
development of these two types of companies is important because economists
believe they are good indicators of private sector development (Sachs, 1994).
In Hungary, there have been 52,000 new businesses of this type incorporated
since 1991 (Sachs, 1994).
Hungary has also imposed special tax advantages for private firms. The
tax system allows for private businesses to reduce the amount of taxes paid
by up to 50% on their net profits (Sachs, 1994). There have also been several
programs in Hungary aimed at privatizing state-owned businesses and shops.
Despite some criticism of the over-all program, the Pre-privatization Law
allowed for individuals to buy state-owned equipment, company stock, and
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real estate. The Self-Privatization Program, started in 1991, gave the State
Property Agency the ability to use consulting companies to facilitate the buy
out of up to 600 small and medium sized companies (Sachs, 1994).
In Poland, there are also many programs aimed to returning the means
of production back to the private individual. Despite obvious problems, the
greatest trend has been restitution, an attempt to give back former owners
their real estate. Other modes of restitution induded vouchers or monetary
compensation. There have been two main privatization programs
implemented in Poland, small and large scale. Small scale privatization
applied to small business that could be sold to individual buyers. These
were mainly restaurants, small shops, and service-oriented businesses. Large
scale privatization applied to the large state-owned enterprises that were
generally too large for an individual buyer to purchase. In order for these
types of enterprises to qualify for privatization, they have to met certain
requirements determining their potential to function efficiently and profitably.
Those enterprises that were determined to be unable to function in a market
economy would be allowed to die out (Shen, 1993).
There also have been new initiatives for individuals to start new business,
not only to acquire previously state-owned businesses. It is necessary to
register new business in Poland, but the registration process for individual
business is surprisingly simple, taking only a few days to complete, compared
with complicated registration process for larger multi-owned businesses
(Sachs, 1994). There are also fewer taxes on individual firms and in 1990
there was a tax holiday for some individual firms. Table 4 shows the increase
Table 4
Number of Individual Firms in Poland

Industry
Construction
Transportation
Trade
Food Service
Other Services
Nonmaterial Services

1990
334,613
165,541
61,368
346,294
22,511
122,099
83,066

1991
348,803
170,618
60,203
514,778
34,845
124,768
111,629

Total Emp.
826,658
392,575
74,575
797,772
83,981
143,953
159,552

Source: Polish Central Statistical Office (fable from Sachs, 1994)

in the number of individual firms as well as the number of employment
opportunities they provide. Overall, both Hungary and Poland have been
successful in creating new private businesses as well as converting previously
owned state enterprises into private corporations. These have been the key
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detenninants of their success. In spite of different refonn strategies, both
have focused on the need to develop the private sector.

Foreign Involvement and Investment
Foreign involvement and investment is extremely important for easing
the pains of transition. Sachs has written extensively on this aspect of refonn.
Throughout history international financial support has enabled
refonnist governments, and their refonn programs, to sunnount the
twin challenges of deep institutional change and day-to-day political
survival. The real contribution of foreign assistance is to help cushion
the burdens of refonn, especially for vulnerable groups, and to give
hope to the population that the reforms will payoff in the medium
tenn (Marer, 1993).
While foreign involvement cannot replace the role of the individual country,
it can have a positive effect on the effectiveness of market refonn, either by
increasing levels of capital and technology or by augmenting levels of
knowledge.
Both Hungary and Poland have significant ties to Western Europe. Their
close proximity is an advantage both have over many other fonner Soviet
states. They also have economic ties to the rest of Europe as well as other
developed nations. Because of their progress in economic refonn as well as
their initial economic status, both countries hold attractive investment
possibilities for foreign investors. Table 5 shows the increase of joint business
ventures with foreign investors. The number in Poland and Hungary are
significantly higher than several other Eastern European nations.
Table 5
Joint Ventures 1989-1991

1989
1990
1991
Total

Poland
867
2,799
4,000
7,666

Romania
5
1,502
2,665
4,172

Hungary
180
4,400
2,420
7,000

Bulgaria
30
140
366
536

(Tablefrom Sachs, 1994)

The IMF and the World Bank also have been involved in the transition
of both economies for many years, dating back even to before the fall of
communism. This is helpful because the IMF and World Bank have been
effective in setting goals for the countries that they themselves either may
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not have been aware of or are hesitant to embark upon. Hungary, in 1982,
was the first Eastern European country to become a member of the IMP and
World Bank. Several times IMP and World Bank involvement prevented
debt crisis in both Poland and Hungary. For example, in 1990 after the
formation of the Antall government, Hungary came close to a foreign
exchange and currency crises. However, with the help of the IMF, the problem
was averted and Hungary was able to continue its reforms (Slay, 1994).
Hungary was successful in attracting foreign investment because its
economy was farther along the road of market development than any other
Eastern European nation before 1989. Foreign investment in Poland was
limited before1988. In fact, it was restricted to small firms with under 200
employees. New laws in 1988 and 1991 removed most of the restrictions
concerning foreign investment, including restrictions on importing and
exporting, profit sharing, and foreign exchange--all of which made investment
in Poland much more attractive (Sachs, 1994). Poland has also made a move
to model the regulations and laws that affect foreign investment to be more
like those in the West. These include changing bank regulations, accounting
practices, and taxation processes. Before the fall of communism, Eastern
bloc countries were mainly tied to trading with other countries in the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). But by 1992, nearly 72% of
Poland's trading was already with other developed nations. Only 16% was
still with the former CMEA (Slay, 1994).
Conclusions and Implications
More factors than just the chosen reform strategy determine the capacity
of a post-communist country to minimize social pain. If, within different
reform policies, certain criteria are met, it is likely the nation will have a
greater chance of being successful in that policy. The cases of Poland and
Hungary have demonstrated that either policy can be appropriate depending
on other factors such as previous reforms, emerging governments, a successful
development of the private sector, and foreign investment. Again, the debate
over whether shock therapy or the gradualist approach is false and
unproductive.
Hungary and Poland have reached similar levels of success on one set of
economic indicators, yet both have suffered certain consequences of the
market transition. Both nations are still dealing with severe economic
problems as well as mounting political tensions. It is very well possible that
the future will bring unsuccessful attempts to met the challenges that
transformation has presented. Already there are signs that the initial steps
towards marketization may not be as positive as initially hoped. Hungary
and Poland arc not healthy market economics ~U1d the day that they will
achieve such stability is still far down the road.
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Even with the economic success in these two countries, the population's
perception of social pain is still important. Despite Hungary and Poland's
comparative economic success within the Eastern European region, they have
not been entirely successful in dealing with social pain. Declining social
welfare policies, shrinking pensions, and rising prices make the every day
citizen aware of the negative aspects of transition. In 1991, in both Poland
and Hungary, over 60% of public opinion reported the present economic
situation worse than under communism (Reinicke, 1992). The working people
are obviously perceiving a degree of social pain.
However, as two of the most successful of the transition economies, it
is important to realize what has brought Poland and Hungary at least this far.
There are certainly many contributing factors to their relative success.
Implications of the determinants of success are hard to quantify. Two of the
factors that have been presented in this study are impossible to implement.
A nation can not engineer a history of reformism that does not exist nor can
it entirely control the character of the government that emerges after transition.
The only current option is to attempt to implement certain measures that
will help to ease the way into a market system.
Above all, because each nation has a unique set of circumstances, we
must be cautious in drawing implications. The combination of economic
and political policy is difficult to hold constant in a world of tunnoil and
change. Tentatively, it can be suggested that a continued emphasis on the
private sector as well as international involvement should be encouraged in
Eastern Europe.
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